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1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
n the wake of accounting scandals and concerns over the 
reliability of financial statements, policymakers have 
increasingly focused on whether investors are receiving 
sufficient information to evaluate companies. In the banking 
industry, the proposed Basel II Accord would require much 
greater disclosure than has occurred traditionally in many 
countries. This controversial proposal has prompted a 
substantial number of industry responses during the public 
comment period.
Four major concerns have been raised with the enhanced 
mandatory disclosure requirements. First, banks are already 
providing information demanded by investors. If investors 
demanded greater disclosure, management would provide it. 
Mandated disclosure is likely to result in information that 
many investors would not utilize. Second, mandated disclosure 
is costly to produce. If the information is not useful for 
managing the bank or requested by investors, the costs will 
outweigh the benefits. Third, mandated disclosure frequently 
reveals proprietary information that could place the bank at a 
competitive disadvantage, particularly relative to financial 
intermediaries not subject to the same disclosure requirements. 
Fourth, mandated disclosure is too complicated to be 
understood by most market participants, which may raise stock 
price volatility. It is this fourth concern that Ursel Baumann 
and Erlend Nier investigate in their paper.
The paper empirically examines the relationship between 
bank stock volatility and disclosure of close to 600 banks in 
thirty-one countries over an eight-year period. Baumann and 
Nier focus on the cross-sectional volatility and use the release 
of financial variables in annual reports (as captured by 
BankScope) as their proxy for disclosure. They find that both a 
composite measure of disclosure and various subindexes of 
disclosure are negatively correlated with stock price volatility. 
They conclude that greater disclosure may be useful to banks 
and investors and may lower the cost of capital by reducing 
stock price volatility.
The paper contributes to the literature by providing 
empirical evidence on whether greater disclosure increases 
stock volatility. Of the arguments raised against disclosure 
by the banking industry, this is perhaps the weakest. While 
the authors’ evidence suggests that enhanced disclosure 
decreases stock price volatility rather than increases it, this 
evidence alone is unlikely to be compelling to a skeptic. 
The empirical work focuses on disclosure, and given the 
empirical design, it concentrates on voluntary, not mandatory, 
disclosure, which is not at the center of the policy debate. 
Nonetheless, the reversal of the volatility argument should 
cause industry commentators to ponder whether they can 
muster alternative empirical evidence on the relationship 
between volatility and disclosure. If not, the controversy 
surrounding enhanced disclosure should focus on more 
cogent arguments.
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2. Mandatory versus Discretionary
Disclosure
No one opposes discretionary disclosure by banks. It is 
mandatory disclosure that is opposed by many bank 
commentators. Unfortunately, this paper provides little insight 
into the issue. The cross-sectional regression includes country 
dummy variables. These variables are needed because of the 
many country differences that could account for differences in 
bank stock volatility not captured by other variables. However, 
this implies that the explanatory power in the disclosure 
variables comes from differences in disclosure at banks within 
countries, or at least controlling for country-specific effects. 
Because these disclosures differ within a country, they are likely 
to reflect increased voluntary disclosure rather than increased 
mandatory disclosure. If increased voluntary disclosure 
reduces stock price volatility, it does not necessarily imply that 
increased mandatory disclosure would do the same.
This result does raise an issue: If voluntary disclosure 
reduces stock volatility, why wouldn’t more banks increase 
their disclosure voluntarily? This is particularly true if bank 
management is using the information for its own internal 
purposes, and there is little incremental cost to producing the 
information. In fact, there are many reasons why bank 
management would oppose value-enhancing disclosures, 
including timing asymmetries, compensation timing, 
management flexibility, and potential advantages to not 
revealing the full risk of activities.
Timing asymmetries occur when management can choose 
to disclose good news quickly but defer bad news until it is 
offset. Thus, bad news is often characterized as one-time events 
and is frequently offset by favorable events. A good example of 
this behavior for many commercial banks is 2003:2, when 
securities losses resulting from unexpected movements in 
interest rates were frequently offset by gains elsewhere in their 
portfolios or in other operations. To the extent that disclosures 
are mandatory, managers lose flexibility in timing disclosures.
Compensation timing has become increasingly important in 
the financial services industry as bonuses and options have 
become increasingly important sources of senior management 
compensation. Should the bank experience a bad year, bunching 
all bad news into that year will make it easier to hit targets in 
future years. Similarly, being close to thresholds in 
compensation can cause management to bunch good news to 
surpass thresholds and enhance compensation in that year. With 
mandatory disclosure, such timing becomes far more difficult.
Discretionary disclosure provides management with flexibility 
in overseeing expectations. Smoothing gains and losses can give 
the appearance of stable earnings, which may be rewarded by 
investors. Similarly, management may prefer to disclose bad news 
at times when competitors are experiencing problems or when 
other economic news may draw less attention to the problems.
Finally, it may be difficult for investors to ascertain the true 
risk of a bank. Opaque institutions may be taking on more 
operational or credit risk than is reported, with investors 
having no way to verify this other than by looking at ex-post 
results. If large-tail events occur infrequently, management 
may be willing to take positions that risk low-frequency, high-
severity losses but have a low probability of being revealed 
during their tenure.
Given these competing incentives, even if voluntary 
disclosures were value enhancing, management may still prefer 
discretionary over mandatory disclosure. If enhanced disclosure 
decreased volatility in stock prices, ceteris paribus, that might be 
a justification for increasing mandatory disclosure. Nonetheless, 
the fact that it provides this benefit would still need to be 
examined against other factors, such as cost.
3. Evaluating the Evidence
on Disclosure and Volatility
Disclosure is difficult to test in a cross-sectional, cross-country 
study because disclosure occurs whenever a bank official 
discusses material issues. As the authors readily admit, they test a 
particular type of disclosure—disclosure in annual reports and 
captured by BankScope. Unfortunately, such reports are likely to 
be only the tip of the iceberg. While mandatory disclosures in a 
given country will be captured because they are likely to occur in 
annual financial statements, the country dummy variable should 
capture that effect along with all other country effects, leaving no 
ability to distinguish how much of the dummy is capturing 
mandatory disclosures. Since many of the most interesting 
disclosures are likely to involve economic capital, vector 
autoregression models, and accounting footnotes, many of the 
most relevant disclosures are omitted from the analysis. In 
addition, other communications, such as analyst calls, other U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission filings, and management 
announcements, are not being captured.
The authors raise an important question in their analysis: Is 
it disclosure, or the need to disclose once a problem faces 
increased scrutiny by investors, that is likely to reduce 
volatility? They note the case of Abbey National in the United 
Kingdom. However, it is not at all uncommon for voluntary 
disclosures to increase to reduce uncertainty. In Japan, as the 
nonperforming loan problems became more severe, the 
strongest banks provided more disclosure to signal that they 
had fewer problems than some of their more troubled peers. 
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market problems in the 1990s led to enhanced disclosure for 
institutions with significant exposures. In fact, one reason why 
a bank may provide more disclosure is that it has more 
exposure to an activity. If so, then the disclosure variable may 
be picking up differences in exposures, rather than differences 
in disclosures.
Although the authors have not chosen to examine the time-
series properties of enhanced disclosures, I believe it is a fruitful 
area for future research. Understanding what causes banks to 
increase disclosure, how long the disclosure continues, and 
what benefits accrue to institutions that enhance their 
disclosure when peer banks do not may help to isolate the effect 
of the benefits of increased disclosure. In the absence of the 
time series, one can only speculate on why disclosures vary by 
banks in the same country. One hypothesis is that banks 
disclose based on what is most material to investors. Small 
banks have few contingent liabilities or off-balance-sheet items 
and thus do not disclose these items systematically. While the 
authors use log size as a control variable, it is unlikely to capture 
the nonlinearities that relate size, scope of activities, and 
disclosure. Potentially splitting the sample by size would help 
identify whether this might be a problem.
A second hypothesis is that banks disclose information 
according to what is required by supervisors. It is not unusual 
to require different disclosures for larger institutions, 
institutions depending on their mix of products (for example, 
home mortgages versus commercial loans), different activities 
(for example, internationally active versus domestic), or 
different regulatory charter environments (for example, federal 
savings and loan versus commercial bank). Thus, a more 
complete study would need to examine why banks within a 
country choose different levels of disclosure.
While many of the variables examined in the paper are 
related to the risk of institutions, Basel II will provide far 
more potential information on credit and operational risk, 
particularly for IRB/AMA (internal ratings-based approach/
advanced measurement approach) banks. These risk measures 
will be needed to determine incremental risk, so there is little 
incremental cost in disclosing variables already necessary for 
calculating capital. Since Basel II is based on economic capital 
models used by banks, it should provide more direct infor-
mation on the risk of organizations. However, these new 
measures are not captured by BankScope, so the benefits and 
costs of Basel II disclosures do not have a direct analogy to 
variables examined in this paper.
4.C o n c l u s i o n
Some opponents of greater disclosure argue that it increases 
stock price volatility. Baumann and Nier provide evidence to 
the contrary. Enhanced disclosure may decrease volatility, and 
their paper provides initial empirical support for that 
proposition. These results add to empirical papers noting other 
benefits of disclosure, such as event studies of banks that have 
increased disclosure on well-publicized problems and have 
improved their stock price. Thus, this paper provides 
additional empirical evidence that enhanced disclosure may be 
advantageous to management and investors.
This is an important policy issue given the current question 
of how much disclosure is appropriate for Pillar 3 of the Basel 
Accord. Some of the debate can benefit from additional 
empirical testing of the propositions of both opponents and 
proponents of greater mandatory disclosure. In addition, more 
work on understanding why banks choose different 
information to disclose, and how it is used by analysts and 
investors, would provide further insight into what types of 
disclosure should be mandated.
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